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AWOL Final Decision

CalHR Case No.:  12-G-0157

Request for Reinstatement after Automatic Resignation (AWOL)

Final Decision Adopted January 11, 2013
By:  Julie Chapman, Director
 
 

PROPOSED DECISION

This matter was heard before Karla Broussard-Boyd, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Department of Human Resources  (CalHR) (fn. 1) at 9:00 a.m. on September 27, 2012 in Delano, California.
 
Appellant was present and self-represented.  Penny Cascio, Medical Employee Relations Officer (Medical ERO), California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS), represented CDCR, Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), CCHCS, respondent.

I - JURISDICTION

On May 1, 2012, CDCR, KVSP, CCHCS, respondent, notified appellant, by mail, she was being automatically resigned for being absent without leave (AWOL) from April 19, 2012 through May 1, 2012.  Appellant filed a request for reinstatement appeal with CalHR on May 7, 2012.  On May 8, 2012, respondent filed an “Amended Notice of Automatic Resignation by Absence without Leave (AWOL)” advising appellant she was being automatically resigned for being absent without leave (AWOL) from April 19, 2012 through May 8, 2012.
 
California Government Code section 19996.2 authorizes CalHR, after timely appeal, to reinstate an employee after automatic resignation if she makes a satisfactory explanation as to the cause of her absence and her failure to obtain leave and CalHR finds she is ready, able, and willing to resume the discharge of the duties of her position.  The appeal complies with the procedural requirements of Government Code section 19996.2.  CalHR has jurisdiction over the appeal.

II - PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After the September 27, 2012 evidentiary hearing, the parties discussed settlement.  On October 30, 2012, appellant requested a post-hearing settlement conference.  The post-hearing settlement conference was held telephonically on November 2, 2012.  Penny Cascio, Medical ERO, CDCR – CCHCS, Performance Management Unit, and appellant appeared telephonically.  No settlement was reached at the post-hearing settlement conference.

III - ISSUES

Appellant argues she had a satisfactory explanation for her absence, had obtained leave and is ready, able, and willing to discharge the duties of a Pharmacy Technician.
 
Respondent argues appellant failed to obtain leave and the action invoking the AWOL statute should be sustained. 
 
The issues to be determined are:
 
1. Did appellant have a satisfactory explanation for her absence from April 19, 2012 through May 8, 2012? 
 
2. Did appellant have a satisfactory explanation for failing to obtain leave from April 19, 2012 through May 8, 2012? 
 
3. Is appellant ready, able, and willing to return to work as a Pharmacy Technician?
 
4. Is appellant entitled to back pay?  

IV - FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence established the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
 
Appellant began her career with the State of California, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, on December 1, 2005.  Her most recent appointment was as a Pharmacy Technician at respondent’s Kern Valley State Prison Pharmacy.  She worked a Monday through Friday shift with office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.  Her supervisor for the last five years was a Pharmacist II. 
 
On February 10, 2011, respondent issued an all staff memorandum signed by the acting Warden.  The letter stated in relevant part:
“If an employee fails to report to his/her assigned post, the employee shall be temporarily considered ‘Absent without leave’ (AWOL).  The area supervisor and Watch Sergeant will begin “AWOL Contact Procedures” consisting of but not limited to the following attempts to locate the missing employee: . . .calling the employee’s home and cell numbers, calling the employee’s emergency contact numbers, contacting co-workers or known friends . . .”  Respondent did not attempt to contact appellant when she failed to report to work during the AWOL period.  There is no evidence to indicate this policy was not in effect in April 2012.
 
In December 2011, appellant was treated by a Workers’ Compensation doctor and placed on disability.  On January 9, 2012, appellant filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Sexual Harassment complaint with respondent alleging unwanted sexual comments and touching from her supervisor dating back to October 2010.  In January 2012, appellant’s Workers’ Compensation claim was denied and she returned to work on February 16, 2012. 
 
On March 1, 2012, respondent provided appellant a memo with basic information regarding its workplace expectations. The memo stated in relevant part:  “If you are sick and cannot report to work, you are to personally contact your supervisor prior to the beginning of your shift.  If you  are unable to reach your supervisor and must leave a message, you must leave a phone number where you can be reached within the next two hours.  Failure to follow these instructions may result in the time being considered AWOL.”
 
On March 9, 2012, appellant became upset when she heard a co-worker say “old shit.”  She believed the employee was referring to her.  After the incident, appellant told her supervisor she was going to the Return-to-Work Coordinator’s (RTWC) office.  The RTWC sent appellant to a Workers’ Compensation doctor.  March 9, 2012 was appellant’s last day at work. 
 
On March 13, 2012, respondent mailed appellant a Letter of Instruction (LOI). The LOI reminded appellant of respondent’s workplace expectations, specifically its call-in procedures.  On March 15, 2012, respondent mailed a “revised and re-issued” Employee Counseling Record to appellant.  The Employee Counseling Record was another attempt to remind appellant of her need to speak to her supervisor if she was not reporting to work.  Appellant’ supervisor had never disciplined her prior to March 2012.
 
On April 4, 2012, a medical doctor gave appellant an off-work order (OWO).  The OWO took appellant off work from April 4, 2012 through July 15, 2012.  Respondent placed appellant on State Disability Insurance (SDI) leave on April 4, 2012 through a Notice of Personnel Action (NOPA). (fn. 2)  The NOPA stated in relevant part, “when you receive medical clearance to return to work, you will be reinstated to your former class or a closely related class. . .”
 
On April 9, 2012, appellant verified with the RTWC her April 4, 2012 doctor’s note had been received.  She also spoke with her supervisor to advise she had provided the doctor’s notes to the RTWC.  Appellant’s supervisor acknowledges her April 9, 2012 phone call to report her absence.  On April 10, 2012, the RTWC sent appellant’s work status to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), California Correctional Health Care Services.  The CEO is appellant’s supervisor's supervisor.
 
The RTWC’s work status memo to the CEO clearly stated, “[t]his memorandum is to inform you of PT [appellant’s] work status due to a NON-INDUSTRIAL medical condition.  Her work status is as follows:  Currently off work on March 20, 2012 through July 15, 2012.”  [Emphasis in original.]  On April 11, 2012, the Institutional Workers’ Compensation Analyst, RTWC sent appellant an options letter.  The options letter indicated “there is no medical information on file to indicate you are or will be unable to perform the essential function of your job” and “if there are options you would like to discuss, please check those options listed on the enclosed option checklist.”  The RTWC’s options letter indicated the appellant should respond no later than April 25, 2012. 
 
Appellant, who had reported her absence to her supervisor and the RTWC, did not respond to the RTWC’s options letter.  The options letter is to assist employees returning to work and, “basically just informing the employee – we’re here if you need us.”  On May 1, 2012, when appellant failed to respond to the RTWC’s options letter, respondent invoked the AWOL statute.  On May 8, 2012, respondent sent an “Amended Notice of Automatic resignation by absence without Leave” letter to appellant.
 
Appellant testified credibly she is willing and able to return to work and produced a doctor’s note indicating she is ready to return to work effective September 27, 2012.

V - ANALYSIS

Government Code section 19996.2(a) states;  “[a]bsence without leave, whether voluntary or involuntary, for five consecutive working days is an automatic resignation from state service, as of the last date on which the employee worked.”  It is not disputed appellant was absent for more than five consecutive days as she was not at work from April 19, 2012 through May 8, 2012.   
 
Section 19996.2(a) also provides:  “[r]einstatement may be granted only if the employee makes a satisfactory explanation to the department [CalHR] as to the cause of his or her absence and his or her failure to obtain leave therefor, and the department finds that he or she is ready, able, and willing to resume the discharge of the duties of his or her position or, if not, that he or she has obtained the consent of his or her appointing power to a leave of absence to commence upon reinstatement.”
 
Appellant had a satisfactory explanation for her absence.

Appellant has the burden of proof in these matters and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence she had a satisfactory explanation for her absence.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826.)  CalHR has long held an illness of an employee or family member is a satisfactory explanation for an absence.  Appellant provided a doctor’s note excusing her from work because of emotional stress and its complications from April 4, 2012 through July 15, 2012.  By providing a doctor’s note excusing her from work for illness, appellant met her burden of proof she had a satisfactory explanation for her absence.
 
Appellant obtained leave

Appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence she had a satisfactory explanation for not obtaining leave.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th 826 at p. 846.)  Respondent and appellant attempt to complicate this AWOL appeal with the specter of a sexual harassment claim by appellant against her supervisor.  However, in an AWOL appeal, the trier of fact need only determine if the appellant satisfactorily obtained leave for a satisfactory reason and is ready to return to work.

Respondent argues it does not need to “chase down” appellant or prove she chose to abandon her position.  Under the AWOL statute, Government Code section 19996.2, this is generally true; however, respondent implemented its own policy regarding absences from work.  The policy required respondent to attempt to locate the missing employee.  If respondent truly believed appellant was absent without leave, it should have followed its own policy and attempted to contact the appellant.  It did not.

Moreover, the evidence in this case shows respondent could not have reasonably believed appellant was absent without leave.  First, respondent knew as early as April 9, 2012, appellant would not be reporting to work because she called her supervisor to report her absence.  Appellant’s supervisor admits appellant called in sick on April 9, 2012 in accordance with respondent’s call-in policy.

Second, respondent knew why appellant did not report to work from April 19, 2012 through May 8, 2012.  Appellant spoke with respondent’s RTWC and confirmed receipt of her doctor’s note taking her off work until July 15, 2012 for emotional stress.  In fact, the RTWC issued a memo on April 10, 2012 to the CEO of the medical facility indicating appellant was on a non-industrial leave through July 15, 2012. 

Additionally, the next day, after advising the CEO of appellant’s non-industrial leave through July 15, 2012, the RTWC sent appellant a letter acknowledging her off- work status.  The letter indicated there was no medical information on file to indicate appellant is, “or will be unable to perform the essential function of her job,” yet there was no evidence appellant was required to provide this information.  More importantly, respondent knew that appellant was not scheduled to return to work until July 15, 2012.  Therefore the April 25, 2012 deadline imposed by the RTWC was arbitrary. 

The phrase “arbitrary and capricious” has no precise meaning and is not defined in statute.  However, conduct which lacks any reasonable basis or is without any rational support whatsoever may be considered to be arbitrary and capricious.  (Madonna v. County of San Luis Obispo (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 57.)  Respondent’s conduct of separating appellant using the AWOL statute is not supported by any substantial reason.  Conduct not supported by a fair or substantial reason is arbitrary.  (Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 398.) 

Respondent’s argument appellant failed to obtain leave is fallacious because it knew appellant was on long-term non-industrial leave.  Furthermore, respondent’s argument appellant should have returned to work when one of her Workers’ Compensation claims was denied in April 2012 is equally flawed.  Respondent admits as early as April 10, 2012 that appellant’s leave status was of a non-industrial nature; therefore, for it to now argue she should have returned to work after a Workers’ Compensation claim was denied, lacks any reasonable basis. 

Respondent’s arbitrary treatment of appellant is also seen in the Notice of Personnel Action (NOPA) prepared on July 31, 2012.  The NOPA indicated respondent placed appellant on state disability leave status effective April 4, 2012.  Had the NOPA been timely issued to appellant, and there is no evidence to show why it was not issued timely, it would have told her, “when you receive medical clearance to return to work, you will be reinstated to your former class or a closely related class. . .” 

Respondent failed to follow its own policy regarding employee absences, acknowledged appellant had a valid reason for her absence, granted her leave when it acknowledged her work status as “off work until July 15, 2012” and then used the AWOL statute to arbitrarily separate her from state service.  Conversely, appellant obtained leave in accordance with respondent’s leave policy and the necessary medical clearance to return to work.
 
Appellant is ready, able, and willing to discharge the duties of a Pharmacy Technician.

Appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence she is ready, able, and willing to discharge the duties of a Pharmacy Technician.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th 826 at p. 846.)  Appellant testified credibly she is ready to return to work as a Pharmacy Technician.  While she expressed a desire for a possible transfer to another prison pharmacy in the future, she manifests a current desire and willingness to return to work.  Additionally, her doctor’s note indicates she is ready to return to work as of September 27, 2012.
 
Appellant is entitled to back pay.
 
Although Government Code section 19996.2 (a) provides, “[a]n employee so reinstated shall not be paid salary for the period of his or her absence or separation or for any portion thereof,” it conflicts with the provisions of appellant’s memorandum of understanding (MOU).  Specifically, Section 6.13 of Bargaining Unit 20’s MOU provides, “[i]n any hearing of an automatic resignation (AWOL) pursuant to Government Code section 19996.2, the hearing officer shall have the discretion to award back pay.  Therefore, appellant is entitled to back pay beginning September 27, 2012 when she was deemed able to return to work until her reinstatement as a Pharmacy Technician.

VI - CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Appellant proved by a preponderance of the evidence she had a satisfactory explanation for her absence and that she obtained leave from respondent.  Appellant proved by a preponderance of the evidence she is ready, able, and willing to discharge the duties of a Pharmacy Technician.  Appellant is entitled to back pay from September 27, 2012 until she is reinstated to her position as a Pharmacy Technician.
 
* * * * *
THEREFORE, IT IS DETERMINED, the appeal for reinstatement after automatic resignation, from the position of Pharmacy Technician, with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Kern Valley State Prison, California Correctional Health Care Services, effective May 7, 2012, is granted.  Respondent shall reinstate appellant and pay her back pay from September 27, 2012 until she is reinstated to her position as a Pharmacy Technician.
 
 Footnotes
 
1.  On July 1, 2012, the Department of Human Resources succeeded the former Department of Personnel Administration in all functions and duties.
2.  The NOPA is dated July 31, 2012.
 
  Updated: 7/29/2014
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